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Abstract—The Body Area Network (BAN) is an emerging
technology that focuses on monitoring physiological data in, on
and around the human body. BAN technology permits wearable
and implanted sensors to collect vital data about the human body
and transmit it to other nodes via low-energy communication.
In this paper, we investigate interactions in terms of data flows
between parties involved in BANs under four different scenarios
targeting outdoor and indoor medical environments: hospital,
home, emergency and open areas. Based on these scenarios, we
identify data flow requirements between BAN elements such as
sensors and control units (CUs) and parties involved in BANs
such as the patient, doctors, nurses and relatives. Identified
requirements are used to generate BAN data flow models. Petri
Nets (PNs) are used as the formal modelling language. We
check the validity of the models and compare them with the
existing related work. Finally, using the models, we identify
communication and security requirements based on the most
common active and passive attack scenarios.
Index Terms—Body Area Networks (BANs), Healthcare mon-
itoring, Sensor, Data flow, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of people are demanding secure
electronic healthcare services. These services and supporting
technologies evolve around BANs. A BAN comprises mostly
of wearable sensors that are worn on-body or implanted in-
body and a CU. Sensors are designed and configured to collect
physiological data related to the human body at any time and
any place while the body is in motion. Each sensor node
transmits data to the CU. The CU works as a gateway interface
for the sensors. It collects, aggregates and forwards the data
to be recorded by a medical server so it can be accessed by a
physician. By using BAN technology, the physician, and other
stakeholders, can monitor personal data remotely in real time
[1].
BAN elements such as sensors and the CU use a radio
connection to communicate. In addition, BANs can communi-
cate with other BANs as well. Each BAN may use a different
wireless communications technology operating at different
frequencies (e.g. 2.4 GHz ISM) to transfer data from inside
to outside or vice versa. Choice of communication technology
depends on the application requirements such as data rate and
communication range [2]. Furthermore, it is also essential to
understand how medical procedures, policies and rules effect
data flow and communication requirements between BAN
elements and BAN participants.
Typically, the capture of vital physiological signals of
individuals or groups by using the BAN technology is still a
challenging issue. Recent developments in mobile computing
and communication permit patients to move freely and be
monitored at any location at any time. However, existing stud-
ies on data flow communications models focus on individual
patient monitoring in indoor environments such as hospital or
home. Huang et al. [3], proposed a general healthcare model
to monitor small groups of patients in indoor environments.
However, healthcare and remote healthcare monitoring of small
and large groups in indoor and outdoor environments have not
been addressed. Moreover, in traditional sensor settings, sen-
sors send their measurements to CUs periodically or whenever
an incident happens. As opposed to this one-way data flow,
in a two-way data flow, CUs may also send codes, queries
or data to sensors to filter, aggregate, relay or cache data for
decreased communication overhead and energy consumption
and improved security.
In the absence of well-established intra- and inter-BAN
data flow models in healthcare monitoring, communication,
security and privacy requirements may not be understood
properly, resulting in critical vulnerabilities. This constitutes an
important factor which may reduce usability and acceptability
of BAN related products in the health domain.
In this paper, we investigate interactions in terms of data
flows between parties involved in BANs under four different
scenarios targeting outdoor and indoor medical environments:
hospital, home, emergency and open areas. We focus on
healthcare and remote healthcare monitoring of individuals and
large patient groups. We consider centralized and decentralized
scenarios and investigate the effects of medical procedures,
rules and policies in BANs. Our work is not limited to one-
way communication from sensors to CUs, but it also considers
possible two-way communication schemes where CUs can
send queries, data and codes to sensors. Based on these
scenarios, we identify data flow requirements between BAN
elements such as sensors and CUs and other parties involved in
BANs. Identified requirements are used to generate BAN data
flow models. PNs are used as the formal modelling language
to check the validity of the models and compare them with the
existing related work. Finally, using the models, we identify
communication and security requirements based on the most
common active and passive attack scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: scenarios
are investigated in Section II. Section III provides data flow
requirements and models. Section IV compares existing BAN
architecture and data flow models in medical environments.
The key security requirements are discussed in Section V.
Finally, Section VI includes the conclusion and future work.
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II. HEALTHCARE SCENARIOS
We focus on four different healthcare scenarios to provide
a model for remote healthcare monitoring for individual and
groups of patients. The overall aim of BANs is to collect and
transmit relevant data from patients to a medical database via
the Internet to be accessed and used by various users within
health environments. To describe and identify requirements
and players in a healthcare scenario, let us suppose that a
patient has had an accident during his travel. Three situations
are included in this scenario. Firstly, a healthcare service
representative can be remotely connected to the CU and reads
the data recorded by the coordinator. The representative may
publish new information to help the patient. Secondly, at
the site of the emergency, a staff member can connect the
coordinator to the patient and read the medical data. Third,
the patient can be moved to hospital for further services.
A number of stakeholders or users (see Fig. 1) need to
access medical data in real time. Each of these people has
a different responsibility and qualification in relation. For
example, Doctor X must access heart rate data and Doctor Y
may need to monitor the blood pressure of the same patient.
Also, Doctor X or Y may be available only at specific times.
These policies and roles would control and monitor who can
access, read, and modify personal data. In addition, patients
may need to change the existing data through the medical
server. In order to provide better healthcare services in an
emergency situation, medical information is recorded on the
CU to make those data accessible by other physicians. Thus,
Patients CU can manage the accessibility of information, in
order to grant access to legitimate users.
According to these scenarios, based on the roles and
responsibilities of a user group, it is quite pertinent to follow
a Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [4]. RBAC entitles user
groups to communicate with each other based on their defined
roles. Additionally, the privacy policy for the user groups may
also require some external conditions. For such conditions, an
Access Control List (ACL) is established of each user in order
to execute particular tasks on specific patient profiles based on
certain parameters (e.g., role/responsibility, department, time,
date, and location). So far, there are several papers such as
[5] published. Studies on security and privacy issue is still an
open issue within the healthcare domain. Figure 1 illustrates
different stakeholders based on the different domains in this
study.
Fig. 1. Stakeholders Based on Different Domains
III. DATA FLOW REQUIREMENTS AND MODELS
This section describes the BAN system architecture and the
developed model.
Intra-BAN communication includes communication among
sensors on the body and communication between sensors on
the body and some external sensors such as CU. The radio
communication range in this tier is restricted to less than 3m
around human body. Power restricted sensors; make it critical
to design energy efficient protocols [6]. In addition, sensing
vital data from sensors and transferring it to external devices is
one of the key challenges in terms of security and privacy [1].
Secondly, Inter-BAN communication occurs between BANs.
The target of the inter-BAN communication is to interconnect
patient CU to varieties of other patients which make it mobile
[7]. Finally, beyond-BAN communication includes rest of the
communication, including data transfer from gateways to data
recorded in medical server through the internet, as well as
cloud storage. Beyond-BAN communication is able to improve
the coverage range as well as the application of healthcare
services [7]. Figure 2 illustrates BAN system architecture in
healthcare environments.
Fig. 2. BAN System Architecture in Healthcare Environment
A. Data Flow in Healthcare Scenarios
In this section, general data flow models (Fig. 2) for
wireless healthcare application involving different stakeholders
in health environments like open area, emergency, home, and
hospital are considered. PNs are used as the modelling lan-
guage and the resulting models are checked for their validity.
In the open area model, the physician would send a request
to the body sensor to analyse and decide on the need for new
services in real time. The query is processed in the CU that is
located with the patient. The CU sends a request to the body
sensors to collect vital data. New personal data is recorded in
the CU and transferred to the medical server via the Internet.
Medical data is then recorded on the medical server so it can
be accessed by various healthcare services.
In an emergency scenario, communication occurs between
the patient and the physician in the ambulance. In this scenario,
staff can monitor the patient directly by connecting to the
CU. The CU sends a request to the body sensors to collect
vital data. In addition, the initial data analysed by staff and
transmitted to the medical server from the ambulance to the
medical server via the Internet. This data is recorded in the
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emergency vehicle and the medical server for use by other
healthcare services.
The third scenario concerns data flow in a home en-
vironment. In addition, a type of environmental sensor is
installed in different locations around the home to monitor
the environmental parameters. Thus, within a home scenario,
we follow two sub-scenarios for monitoring. First, the nurse
can send a request to the patient to analyse personal data at
home. Based on the central communication that is introduced
in the next section, a query is received and processed by the
CU. The CU sends a request to the body sensors to collect
vital data. New personal data is processed and recorded in
the CU and transferred to the home server via Wi-Fi. Due
to limitations in storage and energy, plus other restrictions of
the sensor and the real-time nature of certain sensor data, an
intelligent query method based on a data caching mechanism
can be applied to reduce energy consumption, communication
costs and message size. This mechanism can improve query
efficiency to achieve a higher level of data sharing. Finally, the
nurse receives the data from the home server and analyses it
based on the new situation. In addition, environmental sensors
capture data and these are transferred to the home server. The
home server records and forwards that data to the medical
server via the Internet.
The hospital scenario is a complex scenario, which works
in a similar way to the home environment, but large groups
of patients in the same location use different technology and
services. Communication between different users and devices
in the hospital is a central aspect of the model. Each CU
collects data from body sensors and forwards those to the
nearest access point. As in the home environment, staff can
send a query to the CU. The CU forwards the physiological
data to the medical server via a wireless medium so it can be
recorded. In addition, sensory environmental parameters are
recorded in the medical server to be checked by the staff.
Thus, patients can be added to a group by authentication of
their device. The insurance company can send a query to the
medical server and have access to the patients general data
(e.g. full name) by connecting to the medical server.
B. Data Flow Models
The developed data flow model for the healthcare sce-
narios explained above is depicted in Figure 3. Patients and
physicians can be part of several groups in a domain at
any given time. Based on these characteristics, the dynamic
nature of the stakeholders alludes at updating patient-relevant
information in hospital and cloud. In addition, healthcare
service providers need to access patient information at any time
to monitor their state. Our data flow model enhances the real-
time healthcare program process, which help to provide better
remote healthcare monitoring and services in both indoor and
outdoor domains. The abbreviations of the Figure 3 include
DR (doctor), NUR (nurse), SEN (sensor), AP (access point or
local server), CU (control unit), INS (insurance company) and
ENVS (environmental sensor).
C. The Petri Nets Based Data Flow Models
PNs is a flexible system which enables modelling of
different types of systems in networking and computer bases.
Fig. 3. Hospital, Home, Emergency and Open Area Healthcare Scenarios
A PNs concept includes four parts: place (resources of the
system), transaction (an event that happens to transfer data),
token (number of resources that are called marking), and arc
(direction of the system). Finally, as it applies to the modelled
system, the Platform Independent PNs editor is used with the
simulated model. Figure 4 depicts the data flow model.
The initial marking involves three places, DR, NUR, and
Sensor, where by each one has a token. The model is initiated
by DR who sends a request to monitor data. A token is
transferred from DR or NR to transaction six, which forwards
a token to different environments such as HOS (Hospital),
HOM (Home), OP (Open Area), and EM (Emergency). The
sensor transfers the existing token for analysis where a token is
received in each place from staff. While the token is available
and reaches the HOM, HOS, OP or EM, the token transfers by
firing transaction Zero (T0) from the sensor. After the token
is reached in the CU, firing accrues based on a request from
DR. In this step, token analysis from DR, and the outcome
will be new services or a request to transfer to transaction two
(T2). Tokens received are merged and fired by transaction two
to the medical server location. The data carried by token is
updated and recorded in medical server. Finally, a new token
is transferred to the CU by firing transaction three (T3). The
token is processed by the new place and transaction Five (T5)
fires and the new token is available in the sensor location.
D. Analysis of Data Flow Model Based on Petri Nets
The aim is to analyse and check the properties of the
presented data flow model and provide an accurate result
in relation to boundedness, safety, deadlock, and liveness,
generated state space report investigated. Validation of any
model is necessary to ensure that the outcomes are achievable
as desired. Boundedness in PNs means the graph and output is
bounded when the total number of tokens in each place does
not exceed a finite number for any marking reachable from the
first place. Liveness means that the graph with first marking at
first place is live if it is promised no matter what marking has
been reach from first place. Deadlock in PNs means that no
reachable marking happens during firing. It is also important
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Fig. 4. Data Flow Model Based on Petri Nets
to check that a place in PNs model does not overflow into
other places, which is called safety. Based on the proposed
model, a deadlock will happen when dead marking appears
in the system model. Dead marking will also happen in the
system model when a transaction cannot fire the transfer token
into the next place. Strongly Connected Components (SCC)
show and check the reachability of the model. Reachability in
SCC means that a node must be connected to another node
while receiving or sending tokens. Also, it is used to test and
check an existing loop in the system model where marking
fire by transactions. If the number of the SCC nodes and
number of arcs between nodes in the system model are similar,
that demonstrates that the transaction in the system model is
without livelock.
The full state report present in that model has 90 nodes
as well as 240 arcs. In addition, the SCC-generated report has
90 nodes and 240 arcs, which demonstrates that the proposed
model has no livelocks or loops. It shows that the system model
is reachable because the number of nodes and arcs in SCC
and full state space are similar. The time sequence in both of
the reports is equal to zero based on the system model which
causes the home marking to show none. It means that marking
can be available in the next place after firing transaction. Live
transmission instances and dead transition instances are none,
but dead markings are 2 which mean these markings cannot
bind the transfer to the next place. It is logical, as while the
server sends a request to the client, the server goes into an
idle state while waiting for the clients response to the new
message. As a result of these reports and existing data, all
transactions of the proposed model are free of livelock which
means that the model is safe, boundedness and it has shown
that the system model has no deadlock. In this section, we
used PNs for formal modelling. This formal modelling is used
to understand data flow when dealing with a variety of access
requests such as from doctors and nurses. In this case, we can
define and identify the authenticity of data flow based on the
defined scenario. This formal model will help to verify the
correctness, availability and integrity of the developed model.
Based on the results, the developed model is accepted on the
confirmation of described properties, with all transactions in
presented model activating and terminating as accepted.
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW AND COMPARISONS
Table I compares the existing BAN solutions and their
suitability to developed models. Huang et al. [3] presented
a hierarchical medical network to monitor small group of
people in hospital, home and nursing home areas. Their model
includes three network architectures such as inter- intra- and
beyond-BAN communication and proposes a security access
scheme, where physician can access patients CU directly or
remotely in an indoor environment. However, they did not
consider the effect of stakeholders on others and the related
security implications. Haque et al. [8] proposed a security
model with public key infrastructure (PKI) for an indoor
environment. Symmetric key management is used to establish
secure communication between the stakeholders in a hospital
or home based scenario. Khan et al. [9] proposed a medical
system for hospital and home scenarios and presented a data
flow model based on point-to-point and point-to-multipoint
communication. The objective of the proposed model was to
develop an indoor data flow model to reduce energy consump-
tion. Razzaque et al. [10] presented a data flow model based
on an indoor hospital scenario, comprised of variable sensors
and CU. The main objective of this model was to ensure
suitable network level data flow amongst BAN devices and to
reduce the complexity in the network. Yuce et al. [11] proposed
healthcare network architecture for a two layer network in a
cluster based environment. Presented model reduces human
errors, eventually leading to reduced cost of healthcare service.
Zhang et al. [4] proposed a model to provide access control
based on roles and responsibility of stakeholders within a
particular domain. They integrated roles with network security
to provide fine-grain access control for external users.
The mobility of stakeholders contribute to some of the
major issues with using BAN in a healthcare setting. However,
most of the past data flow models as shown in Table I focus
on the indoor area to provide security mechanisms and they
only support individual or small groups of people. To the
best of authors knowledge, mobility of patient in existing new
technologies, data communications in small and large groups
of patients in indoor as well as outdoor medical environment
have not been addressed. We need to provide suitable dy-
namic network architecture within healthcare areas to transfer
medical data in both indoor and outdoor environments with
a variety of network scale and topology. The provision of a
mechanism to allow authorised users to access patient profiles
directly or remotely from any location is also crucial. BAN
is exposed to many types of attacks as it regularly works
with diverse technologies within a variety of environments,
allowing open access by different people in healthcare. Strong
mechanisms are required to protect the privacy of data against
any threats. Additionally, customized interfaces are required to
allow multiple users to share and access the medical data at
any place and any time.
As seen in the research literature, the indoor environment
is considered to provide most of the healthcare network archi-
tecture to support patients. Also, there is no attention towards
privacy protection in medical data with secure healthcare
applications in BAN. The limitations of existing studies are
4
















Bluetooth Yes No Yes No 2.4 GHz
Reduced the average routing
latency and transmission delay
Haque et
al. [8] No sensor Hospital
IEEE 802.15.4








ZigBee No No Yes No 2.4 GHz
Reduced energy consumption





EMG Hospital IEEE 802.15.4 No No No No 2.4 GHx
Reduced latency and energy
consumption per packet
Yuce [11] ECG, EEG,EMG Hospital
MICS, WMTC,
UWB, ZigBe, Wifi No No No No 3-10GHz,2.4 GHz
Reduced the delay of network
and cost of communication
Zhang et
al. [4] No sensor Hospital —– No No Yes Yes —– Variety of policies and roles
focussed towards medical environment in indoor area, and
their security mechanisms cannot satisfy security requirements
in BAN. Finally, it is clear that we need to provide suitable
medical network architecture to support both indoor and out-
door medical environments for individuals as well as groups
of people. In addition, the efficiency of the security protocol is
required to adopt a dynamic topology or network architecture.
V. SECURITY REQUIREMENT FOR DEVELOPED
MODEL
We identify the appropriate security requirements which
are important for developing strong security mechanisms to
secure communication and protect the data from unauthorised
users in BANs systems. BAN systems need to be fortified
with security and access control mechanisms for use in health
care. Figure 5 shows a security scenario based on a data flow
model in this study. The figure shows how an unauthorised
user would be able to attack shared information on air. Pro-
viding security for BAN requires a clear understanding of the
network topologies, components, communicating parties and
data flow requirements which are presented above. To identify
the security requirements based on the proposed model, some
attack scenarios are presented in the following sections.
A. Attack Models
In this section, different types of attacks targeting network
and application based data are identified and presented.
Fig. 5. Attack Scenario Based on Developed Model
1) Attacks targeting communication network: In the health-
care domain, passive attacks are capable of causing life-
threatening invasions of privacy. With critical shared data and
various medical devices that are wireless in nature, attacks
such as traffic analysis and eavesdropping can easily happen
in BAN. The attackers steal medical data by eavesdropping
on wireless communications while critical data is transferred
from patient to medical servers or vice versa. In this situation,
the attacker is able to compromise the patients privacy by
executing crypt-analytical attack on the eavesdropped data.
There are various forms of active attack in the healthcare
domain. Due to wireless nature of the communication, a BAN
is susceptible to classical attacks such as message modifi-
cation, replay of recorded messages, man-in-the-middle and
masquerade. As described in the literature, the attacker could
attempt to compromise the sensor nodes held by the patient.
A captured node in a BAN system can be manipulated to
apply modifications and intercept attacks. Due to sensitive and
critical health data being stored and shared over the networks,
there is a possibility of a number of eavesdropping attacks
happening at the same time and location, which results in a
collusion attack [12].
2) Attacks targeting the data and applications: An external
user such as a physician needs to access medical resource
to obtain medical information. This demand can make BAN
communication open to Internet attacks. In a case such as this,
an adversary would be able to send a query by the same ID and
MAC address to compromise the CU. According to the initial
authorisation between the sensor and the CU, an adversary
could access the medical data in the CU. Also, the CU could
forward a query to the medical server or physician requesting
further services which could endanger the whole network. It
is necessary to apply access control over users based on the
variety of roles, policies and access levels to mitigate this type
of attack and prevent unauthorised access.
Multiple physicians in the same or different locations
present a diversity of roles and policies in the proposed
model. An adversary may be able to attack devices that are
held by a physician (e.g. Smartphone). These devices are in
communication with other base stations to monitored medical
data in real time if required. As a result, an adversary would be
capable of endangering critical data recorded in the different
medical databases. Based on this, an adversary could be able
to access all the medical data in any location via the doctor
who has full permission to access the medical resources. It
is important to maintain control over who has been granted
access to write and read the shared data in networks.
Authentication and secrecy attacks enable the execution of
types of attack such as impersonation, which could be harmful
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for patients privacy. Authentication and secrecy attacks cause
threats like location and activity tracking, which can be a
disaster for information shared in networks. By sending extra
redundant packets, the simplest type of Denial of Service
(DoS) attack attempts to use up the resources available to the
node under attack.
An attack at the beginning of the sensor deployment in
a BAN network is an important issue which has not been
addressed in past studies. An adversary could attack patients at
the beginning of a network, and she could obtain critical secu-
rity parameters, such as the shared keys. Finally, the attacker
could access recorded medical data which could threaten the
life of patients. Also, this attack could deplete the battery in a
sensor which is not suitable for BAN. Furthermore, a number
of malwares, such as Cajino and Vdloader are available on new
smart devices such as android smartphones which can transfer
data to the internet using different mechanisms such as 4G.
This malware can open a back door or install some applications
in attempts to change access levels of different users, stealing
confidential information and compromising devices which can
lead to life-threatening situations [13].
B. Security Requirements Based on Proposed Model
In this paper, we have developed data flow model and
verified the developed model with its formal analysis using
PNs. Based on our model, BAN can be used as a great
technology, which increases the mobility of patients. As a
result, it need to have a suitable security mechanisms which
can be easily adapted to dynamic topologies and network
architecture.
Based on these scenarios, all domains require different
authorities to manage different people. Thus, there are different
authorities to interact with each other in a medical BAN
architecture. Therefore, we have different ways to populate
sensor networks to support indoor and outdoor healthcare envi-
ronment based on the network architecture. Communication in
indoor and outdoor environment based on different authorities
raises a serious security concern in BANs, which encourages
us to present a key management technique to address these
problems in medical network architecture.
Addressing the above mentioned problems associated with
different scenarios and the goals required to achieve the desired
outcomes, each domain has variety of people with multiple
roles. These users access patients information based on an
authorization level which is assigned to them based on their
specific roles and authorization. In a medical environment it
is important to know who manages authorities in different
domains. In addition, it is important to know who has access
to medical data and the level of access. In our scenarios,
patients, nurses, and doctors can communicate from anywhere.
According to these problems, we need to find an optimal
solution towards access control. This study will enhance the
existing key management and access control mechanism to
address and meet these security requirements in BAN.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
BAN is an emerging technology used for monitoring vital
data to improve the quality of life. The data security and
privacy of BANs still pose some challenges that need to be
overcome. In this paper, we have developed and presented four
data flow models using different scenarios (hospital, home,
emergency, and open area). These models provide better health
remote monitoring in indoor and outdoor areas. In addition, we
have identified and presented security requirements necessary
to protect personal data against a variety of passive and active
attacks. Finally, we have compared this study to existing BAN
models to highlight its strengths and weaknesses.
The significance of this study lies in developing medical
network architectures to provide better remote healthcare mon-
itoring of individual and large patients groups in indoor and
outdoor environments within BAN communication. This can
be the basis for future study of BANs in terms of security
and privacy. Future work will focus on developing strong key
management and access control models to meet BAN security
requirements.
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